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NOTES
CREDIT DISCRIMINATION BASED ON
GENDER: THE NEED TO EXPAND THE
RIGHTS OF A SPOUSAL GUARANTOR UNDER
THE EQUAL CREDIT OPPORTUNITY ACT
“Now, as a nation, we don’t promise equal outcomes, but
we were founded on the idea everybody should have an
equal opportunity to succeed. No matter who you are, what
you look like, where you come from, you can make it.
That’s an essential promise of America.”1
ABSTRACT
This Note focuses on the definition of “applicant” as defined in the
Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) and Regulation B. Specifically, this
Note explores the expanded protections offered by the ECOA to spousal
guarantors, after the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) expanded the definition
of “applicant” by promulgating Regulation B. However, after a circuit
split, where the Eighth Circuit, in Hawkins v. Community Bank of
Raymore, held that a guarantor was not an “applicant” per the ECOA’s
definition and the Sixth Circuit, in RL BB Acquisition, LLC v. Bridgemill
Commons Development Group, LLC, followed Regulation B’s expansion of
the definition of “applicant,” a void was created in anti-discriminatory
laws meant to prevent gender discrimination in lending practices. To
address the void, this Note will argue that it is imperative for Congress to
amend the ECOA to include the Spousal Guarantor Rule as previously
required by the FRB. Furthermore, this Note argues that a reporting
requirement is necessary to measure the impact and effectiveness of the
ECOA.
INTRODUCTION
Whether it was marching for the right to vote, working in factories
during World War II, leading some of the nation’s largest companies, or
starting their own businesses, the significant contributions women have
made to society are immeasurable.2 Even with all of these achievements,
women continue to face discrimination in many areas of life. Whether the
1. President Barack Obama, Remarks at the College Opportunity Summit (Dec. 4, 2014).
2. 1941 Women Take Over Factory Work During World War II, MASSACHUSETTS AFL-CIO,
http://www.massaflcio.org/1941-women-take-over-factory-work-during-world-war-ii (last visited
Mar. 6, 2016) [hereinafter 1941 Women Take Over Factory Work]; #15 Indra Nooyi, FORBES,
http://www.forbes.com/profile/indra-nooyi/ (last visited Mar. 6, 2016); Chad Brooks, 12
Businesses You Didn’t Know Were Started By Women, BUSINESS NEWS DAILY (July 20, 2015,
1:34 PM), http://www.businessnewsdaily.com/2156-women-owned-businesses.html.
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measure of gender discrimination is the discrepancy in wages, the small
number of female executives, or the difficulty in obtaining a loan, there
currently exists a gap between men and women.3 To combat the effects of
gender discrimination, Congress passed various pieces of legislation. In
particular, in 1974, Congress enacted the Equal Credit Opportunity Act4
(ECOA) in an effort to eliminate discriminatory lending practices.5
Congress tasked the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) with the implementation
and enforcement of the ECOA.6 To achieve this goal, the FRB promulgated
and enacted Regulation B to enforce the ECOA.7
Prior to the passage of the ECOA, if a woman desired to obtain credit,
many lenders required that the woman have a man apply as the applicant for
credit.8 The ECOA explicitly prohibits this conduct.9 However,
guarantors,10 common in many credit-lending transactions, whether male or
female, lack the same gender discrimination protections as applicants under
the ECOA. This is because guarantors are not explicitly included within the
definition of “applicant” under the ECOA.11 This void in discrimination
protection is especially prevalent in spousal lending situations, where a
lender requires an applicant’s spouse to sign as a guarantor to obtain credit.
To better combat credit discrimination based on gender and to avoid
gender discrimination by simply transitioning from applicants to guarantors,
3. Eric Morath, The Gender Pay Gap Widens as Men’s Earnings Grow Twice as Fast as
Women’s, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 20, 2015, 12:45 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2015/10/20/the
-gender-pay-gap-widens-as-mens-earnings-grow-twice-as-fast-as-womens/; Ben Hallman,
Mortgage Discrimination Study Finds Women Received Fewer Approvals in Wake of Crash,
HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 12, 2013, 6:27 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/12/mortga
ge-discrimination_n_2862834.html; Caroline Fairchild, Why So Few women Are CEOs (in 5
Charts), FORTUNE (Jan. 14, 2015, 10:00 AM), http://fortune.com/2015/01/14/why-so-few-
women-ceos/; Kenneth R. Harney, U.S. Penalizes Lenders Over Maternity-Related Mortgage
Discrimination, L.A. TIMES (July 6, 2014, 5:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/realestate/
la-fi-harney-20140706-story.html.
4. Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (2012).
5. Equal Credit Opportunity Act – Regulation B, USF FEDERAL CREDIT UNION,
https://usffcu.org/EqualCreditOpportunityAct.asp (last visited on Mar. 6, 2015).
6. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RES. SYS., CONSUMER COMPLIANCE HANDBOOK,
FEDERAL FAIR LENDING REGULATION AND STATUTES EQUAL CREDIT OPPORTUNITY ACT
(REGULATION B) 1 (2015), http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/supmanual/cch/fair_lend_re
g_b.pdf [hereinafter CONSUMER COMPLIANCEHANDBOOK].
7. See generally 12 C.F.R. § 202 (1996); Andrea M. Farley, Note, The Spousal Defense—A
Ploy to Escape Payment or Simple Application of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act?, 49 VAND. L.
REV. 1287, 1287 n.2 (1996) (“This regulation was issued by the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System pursuant to the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, and is codified at 12 C.F.R.
section 202 (1996).”).
8. Gail R. Reizenstein, Note, A Fresh Look At the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 14 AKRON
L. REV. 215, 216 (1981) (quoting Donna Dunkelberger Geck, Equal Credit: You Can Get There
From Here-The Equal Opportunity Act, 52 N.D. L. REV. 381, 388 (1975)).
9. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(1) (2012).
10. Guarantor, BLACK’S LAWDICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“Someone who makes a guaranty
or gives security for a debt.”)
11. 15 U.S.C. § 1691a(b) (2012).
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the FRB expanded the definition of “applicant” through Regulation B to
include guarantors,12 thereby providing guarantors with the same standing
as an applicant to sue a lender for violating the ECOA.13 This expansion
under Regulation B—known as the Spousal Guarantor Rule—is limited to
prohibiting a lender from requiring an applicant’s spouse to sign as a
guarantor to a loan.14 However, the Regulation B definition of applicant,
and thereby the Spousal Guarantor Rule, was weakened when the Eighth
Circuit split with the Sixth Circuit regarding the differing definitions of
“applicant” as defined in the ECOA and Regulation B.15 The question
before both courts was whether a spousal guarantor is an “applicant,”
thereby granting the spousal guarantor the same legal rights as an applicant
of a loan.16 Because Regulation B considered guarantors to be an applicant,
it gave guarantors the same legal standing as an applicant to sue for
discriminatory lending practices. The Eighth Circuit, in Hawkins v.
Community Bank of Raymore, held that a guarantor was not an “applicant”
per the ECOA definition, whereas the Sixth Circuit, in RL BB Acquisition,
LLC v. Bridgemill Commons Development Group, LLC, expanded the scope
of the ECOA by including guarantors within the definition of “applicant,”
thus following Regulation B.17 Although the Supreme Court’s split decision
affirms the Eighth Circuit’s holding,18 it does not render the Spousal
12. 12 C.F.R. § 202.7(e) (2009).
13. ECOA and Spouse-Guarantor Rights: Another Court, Another View, FBT BANKING
RESOURCE: FIN. SERVS. BLOG (Sept. 3, 2014), http://www.fbtbankingresource.com/ECOA-AND-
SPOUSE-GUARANTOR-RIGHTS [hereinafter ECOA and Spouse-Guarantor Rights].
14. See 12 C.F.R. § 202.7(d) (2009); Equal Credit Opportunity; Revision of Regulation B;
Official Staff Commentary, 50 Fed. Reg. 4,8018, 4,8019 (Nov. 20, 1985) (“A creditor must
comply with rules that prohibit requiring the spouse to guarantee the loan.”); see also Guidance on
Regulation B Spousal Signature Requirement, FDIC, https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/financial/2
004/fil0604a.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2014).
15. See Hawkins v. Cmty. of Raymore, 761 F.3d 937 (8th Cir. 2014); see also RL BB
Acquisition, LLC v. Bridgemill Commons Dev. Grp., LLC, 754 F.3d 380 (6th Cir. 2014); John R.
Mussman, Spotlight on Fair Lending, REED SMITH: FIN. REG. REP. (Sept. 9, 2014),
https://www.financialregulatoryreport.com/financial-services-regulation-u-s/spotlight-on-fair-
lending/; Richard A. Roth, Spouses Who Guaranty Loans Aren’t Applicants Under Equal Credit
Law, WOLTERS KLUWER (Aug. 5, 2014), http://www.dailyreportingsuite.com/banking-
finance/news/spouses_who_guaranty_loans_aren_t_applicants_under_equal_credit_law.
16. Roth, supra note 15; see also RL BB Acquisition, 754 F.3d 380; Hawkins, 761 F.3d 937.
17. Aaron Ficks, Eighth Circuit Opens Circuit Split on the Scope of the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act, JD SUPRA (Sept. 23, 2014), http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/eighth-circuit-
opens-circuit-split-on-th-62586/; Sixth Circuit Strengthens Spousal Guaranty Rule, FBT BANKING
RESOURCE: FIN. SERVS. BLOG (AUG. 12, 2014), http://www.fbtbankingresource.com/SPOUSAL-
GUARANTY-RULE; Hawkins v. Cmty. of Raymore, 761 F.3d 937 (8th Cir. 2014), petition for
cert. filed, 2014 WL 5762869, at *23 (U.S. Nov. 3, 2014) (No. 14-520) (“Under the Eighth
Circuit’s narrow reasoning, a primarily and unconditionally liable spousal guarantor who wants to
renew, extend or continue the credit is not an applicant because Congress unambiguously intended
to exclude them from the ECOA’s protections because they did not participate in the initial loan-
application process.”)
18. See generally James Freije, Split Supreme Court Affirms Eighth Circuit Equal Credit
Opportunity Act Ruling, JD SUPRA (Apr. 8, 2016), http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/split-
supreme-court-affirms-eighth-17070/.
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Guarantor Rule invalid.19 Instead, neighboring states have different
interpretations of the same federal statute; thus, this jurisdictional split in
the law creates a void in anti-gender discrimination laws.20 Effectively,
guarantors who are required to sign for their spouse do not have legal
standing to sue a creditor under the ECOA until they themselves have
defaulted on the loan. This could lead to more situations of gender
discrimination where lenders might require a female spouse to guaranty a
loan instead of either being a co-applicant or having no association with the
loan. By failing to provide a spousal guarantor the same legal standing as an
applicant, the spousal guarantor might face financial and mental distress.
This Note argues that the Eighth Circuit’s decision voiding Regulation
B’s definition of “applicant” was correct. However, to address the void that
was created by the Eight Circuit’s ruling, this Note will argue that it is
imperative for Congress to amend the ECOA to include the Spousal
Guarantor Rule as previously required by the FRB. Failure to amend the
ECOA to include this provision will negatively affect spousal guarantors,
and more specifically, female spousal guarantors. By delaying the spousal
guarantor’s ability to bring a lawsuit until they are in default, the guarantor
might experience financial difficulties, struggle to obtain credit in the future
because of their guaranty, and suffer mental and emotional distress from all
the problems associated with the discriminatory lending practices.21 This
could prevent women from obtaining credit at the market rate, thereby
affecting the potential positive contributions women can make to society,
such as starting their own business. Additionally, by failing to expand the
scope of the term “applicant,” a lender could require an applicant to have
their spouse sign as the guarantor instead of as a co-applicant, thereby
circumventing the ECOA and leading to discrimination against an
individual based on their gender and marital status. Finally, to ensure
compliance with the ECOA and to measure its impact, this Note will briefly
argue for the addition of a reporting requirement to the ECOA. The
reporting requirement will require lenders and borrowers to provide data to
the government to ensure that lenders are complying with the ECOA.
Part I of this Note introduces the legislative history of the ECOA and
Regulation B. Part II briefly considers whether the ECOA is still necessary
and analyzes the current impact of the ECOA. Part III discusses the facts,
holdings, and analysis of the cases from the Sixth and Eighth Circuits,
respectively. Part IV explains why the Eighth Circuit’s holding, rejecting
the FRB’s definition of “applicant,” is the correct ruling, despite its
reinforcement of the legislative void of protecting spousal-guarantors from
19. ECOA and Spouse-Guarantor Rights, supra note 13.
20. Supreme Court Issues First Split Decision Since Scalia’s Death, RT (Mar. 22, 2016),
https://www.rt.com/usa/336771-supreme-court-split-decision/.
21. Brief of Appellants at 28, Hawkins v. Cmty. Bank of Raymore, 761 F.3d 937 (8th Cir.
2014) (No. 13-3065), 2013 WL 6069373, at *13.
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gender discrimination in lending. Finally, Part V argues that this loophole in
the ECOA will negatively affect a woman’s right to access credit and as
such, Congress should amend the ECOA to include guarantors within the
definition of “applicant” to allow spousal guarantors who have faced
discrimination to have standing to sue the lender before defaulting on the
loan. Additionally, this Note will argue that Congress should incorporate a
reporting requirement of ECOA violations to measure the effectiveness of
the ECOA.
I. INTRODUCTION TO THE ECOA AND REGULATION B
A. THE ECOA’S LEGISLATIVEHISTORY
When a court must determine, as part of its analysis, the meaning of a
phrase or a word in the legislation, it is of the utmost importance that the
court understands Congress’s specific intent behind drafting that particular
legislation. Therefore, akin to the courts, this Note will begin with an
extensive look at the legislative history of the ECOA.
During the 1960s and 1970s, women entered the workforce in greater
numbers than in previous United States’ history.22 Accordingly, in 1963,
Congress passed the Equal Pay Act, which stipulated that employers must
pay women the same amount as men for similar work.23 Additionally, by
this time, consumers in general had become increasingly reliant on credit to
finance their purchases and their businesses.24 However, despite the
significant social contributions that women made at the time,25 lenders
regularly denied women the ability to receive credit in their own name
simply because of their gender.26
In 1972, the National Commission on Consumer Finance issued a
report identifying five major patterns of credit discrimination against
women.27 The five major patterns were:
(1) Single women have more trouble obtaining credit than single men. (2)
Creditors generally require a woman upon marriage to reapply for credit,
usually in her husband’s name. Similar reapplication is not asked of men
when they marry. (3) Creditors are unwilling to extend credit to a married
woman in her own name. (4) Creditors are usually unwilling to count the
22. Howard N. Fullerton, Jr., Labor Force Participation: 75 Years of Change, 1950–98 and
1998–2025, MONTHLY LAB. REV. 3 (Dec. 1999), http://www.bls.gov/mlr/1999/12/art1full.pdf.
23. Kimberly J. Houghton, Note, The Equal Pay Act of 1963: Where Did We Go Wrong?, 15
LAB. L. 155, 155–56 (1999).
24. Dubravka Ritter, Do We Still Need the Equal Credit Opportunity Act?, FED. RES. BANK OF
PHILA. 1 (Sept. 2010), http://www.phil.frb.org/consumer-credit-and-payments/payment-cards-
center/publications/discussion-papers/2012/D-2012-equal-credit-opportunity-act.pdf.
25. 1941 Women Take Over Factory Work, supra note 2 (as men went to war during World
War II, women stepped up to work in factories that made the equipment needed for war).
26. Reizenstein, supra note 8, at 216.
27. Id. at 219.
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wife’s income when a married couple applies for credit. (5) Women who
are divorced or widowed have trouble reestablishing credit. Women who
are separated have a particularly difficult time, since the accounts may still
be in the husband’s name.28
Further discrimination “evolved out of the widely-held presumption
directed at the probability of pregnancy, the subsequent termination of
employment upon childbirth, and the general instability and inability of
women to control their personal affairs (especially single and divorced
women).”29 Before the ECOA, a married woman had to apply for credit
under her husband’s name, even if she was creditworthy herself.30 This was
because “[t]he divorced, separated or widowed woman was considered a
bad credit risk because she was without male support, financial or
otherwise.”31 Additionally, many creditors requested information about a
woman’s choice of birth control and her plans to conceive children.32 Some
creditors went as far as requiring women to sign an affidavit “swearing not
to endanger their ability to repay their debts by having children.”33
Subsequently, in 1973, Congress held numerous hearings on the matter.
At a Joint Economic Committee hearing, Representative Martha W.
Griffiths34 stated in her opening remarks that:
[s]ingle women who apply for a mortgage or personal loan are often
required to have cosigners even though their incomes are high enough to
secure the loan. Married women who work find that lending institutions
often discount most of their salaries when they and their husbands apply
for a mortgage.35
Representative Griffiths added that “[w]omen, married, divorced, or
widowed, encounter repeated discrimination in applying for consumer
credit. Upon marriage, many credit companies require a woman to reapply
for credit under her husband’s name, even when she earns adequate
28. Id. at 216.
29. Id.at 219.
30. Id. at 225.
31. Id. (quoting Donna Dunkelberger Geck, Equal Credit: You Can Get There From Here-The
Equal Opportunity Act, 52 N.D. L. REV. 381, 388 (1975)).
32. Id. at 217.
33. Id. (quoting Comment, Credit Equality Comes to Women: An Analysis of the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act, 13 SANDIEGO L. REV. 960, 965 nn.28, 29 (1976)).
34. Griffiths Martha Wright, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: HISTORY,
http://history.house.gov/People/Listing/G/GRIFFITHS,-Martha-Wright-(G000471)/ (last visited
Mar. 30, 2016) (Martha W. Griffiths was the second women from Michigan elected to the House
of Representatives).
35. Economic Problems of Women: Hearing Before the J. Economic Comm., 93rd Cong. 152
(1973) (statement of U.S. Rep. Griffiths, Member, Joint Econ. Comm.) (“When the Federal Home
Loan Bank Board conducted a survey of 74 savings and loans, they found that only 22 percent
would count all of the wife’s salary, 26 percent would count only half her income, 10 percent
would count one-quarter and 25 percent would count none.”).
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income.”36 If a woman became divorced or widowed, credit companies
would not lend to that woman because she did not have a credit record.37
During the same hearing, there was testimony describing an employee of
the Women’s Law Fund in Cleveland saying that it was “un-American to
count a woman’s income and that the only way a woman’s income could be
counted would be if she were to ‘have a hysterectomy.’”38
In response to this evident discrimination, Congress passed the ECOA
in 1974.39 The original goal of the ECOA was to “prohibit credit
discrimination based on gender or marital status.”40 In 1976, Congress
amended the ECOA to expand the categories of prohibited credit
discrimination.41 This expansion of the ECOA now stipulated that “[i]t shall
be unlawful for any creditor to discriminate against any applicant, with
respect to any aspect of a credit transaction on the basis of race, color,
religion, national origin, sex or marital status, or age.”42 It is important to
note that the ECOA does not create a legal right to credit; it creates a legal
right to equal access to credit.43
B. THE ECOA, REGULATION B, AND THEDEFINITION OF
“APPLICANT”
Congress gave broad authority to the FRB to promulgate regulations in
order to enforce and implement the ECOA.44 The FRB promulgated
Regulation B to interpret the ECOA and to aid in its enforcement.45 The
basic premise of Regulation B was to ensure that “[a] creditor shall not
discriminate against an applicant on a prohibited basis regarding any aspect
of a credit transaction.”46 Specifically, creditors cannot discriminate against
an applicant because of “race, color, religion, national origin, sex, marital
status, or age.”47
36. Id.
37. Id. (“The irony of these credit practices is that when a woman is divorced, separated, or
widowed she often is denied credit by these same credit companies on the grounds that she has no
established credit record.”)
38. Id. at 192.
39. See generally Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (1974); The Equal Credit
Opportunity Act and Regulation B, PRACTICAL GUIDE TO BANK COMPLIANCE 3 (2 ed. 2009)
[hereinafter ECOA & Reg. B] (“In 1974, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act was enacted into law
after the House and Senate were able to reconcile their respective bills regarding credit
discrimination.”).
40. Farley, supra note 7, at 1288; see also Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691
(congressional findings and statement of purpose).
41. Reizenstein, supra note 8, at 220 (“Within five months of its effective date, the Act was
amended to encompass other categories of discriminatory practices.”).
42. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(1) (1976).
43. Reizenstein, supra note 8, at 223.
44. See ECOA & Reg. B, supra note 39, at 3; 15 U.S.C. § 1691b (2012).
45. See CONSUMER COMPLIANCEHANDBOOK, supra note 6.
46. 12 C.F.R. § 202.4(a) (2009).
47. Id. § 202.2(z).
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While the ECOA defines “applicant” as “any person who applies to a
creditor directly for an extension, renewal, or continuation of credit, or
applies to a creditor indirectly by use of an existing credit plan for an
amount exceeding a previously established credit limit[,]”48this definition of
applicant is narrower as it does not include “guarantor.” Dissatisfied by the
narrow definition of applicant, the FRB, in 1985,49 defined “applicant” in
Regulation B as “any person who requests or who has received an extension
of credit from a creditor, and includes any person who is or may become
contractually liable regarding an extension of credit. For purposes of
§202.7(d), the term includes guarantors, sureties, endorsers, and similar
parties.”50 This definition of applicant explicitly includes guarantors for the
limited purpose of the Spousal Guarantor Rule.51
Under the Spousal Guarantor Rule, the FRB prohibited a lender from
“requir[ing] the signature of an applicant’s spouse” on a credit application,
where the borrower met the lender’s requirements for obtaining credit.52 By
reading in the expanded definition of applicant into Regulation B’s section
202.7(d), the applicant’s spouse, if she were required to sign as a guarantor,
would have the same legal standing as the applicant to sue a lender for
violating the ECOA. The FRB enacted the Spousal Guarantor Rule to
address the denial of credit to women without a man’s signature. Prior to
the enactment of the ECOA, women, even if creditworthy, were unable to
obtain credit without an accompanying male signature.53 Regulation B
prohibits this conduct. To the greatest extent possible, this regulation
mitigates an applicant’s need for their spouse to sign as a guarantor to
obtain credit.54 Thus, under a reading of Regulation B’s definition of
applicant, a spouse who was required by a lender to sign as a guarantor
would have standing to sue the lender for discriminatory lending practices,
whereas, under a reading of the ECOA’s definition of applicant, the spousal
guarantor would have to wait until she is in default of the loan before she
can have standing to sue. By requiring the spousal guarantor to delay a
lawsuit until they are in default, the guarantor might experience
consequential financial difficulties therefrom.55
Since the Spousal Guarantor Rule, as implied by its name, is limited to
spousal guarantors, a nonspousal guarantor would not have standing to sue
48. Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691a(b) (2012).
49. Brief of Respondent at 41, Hawkins v. Cmty. Bank of Raymore, 136 S.Ct. 19 (2015) (No.
14-520), 2015 WL 4550210.
50. 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(e) (2012).
51. Id. § 202.7(d)(1).
52. Id.
53. Diane Pearl, Rights Women Didn’t Use To Have, MARIECLAIRE (Aug. 18, 2014),
http://www.marieclaire.com/politics/news/a10569/things-women-couldnt-do-1920/.
54. See ECOA & Reg. B, supra note 39, at 30.
55. Brief of Appellants at 28, Hawkins v. Cmty. Bank of Raymore, 761 F.3d 937 (8th Cir.
2014) (No. 13-3065), 2013 WL 6069373, at *13.
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a creditor until the guarantor defaulted on the loan. This distinction is
important because the FRB tried to balance the interests of the creditors by
protecting them from frivolous lawsuits, while attempting to protect the
borrower from discriminatory lending practices. To further balance the
creditor’s interest in learning as much as possible about a borrower, while
still protecting the borrower from discrimination, Regulation B does not
preclude a creditor from requesting certain information about a borrower’s
spouse. The FRB allows a creditor to ask about a spouse, if:
(i) The spouse will be permitted to use the account; (ii) The spouse will be
contractually liable on the account; (iii) The applicant is relying on the
spouse’s income as a basis for repayment of the credit requested; (iv) The
applicant resides in a community property state or is relying on property
located in such a state as a basis for repayment of the credit requested; or
(v) The applicant is relying on alimony, child support, or separate
maintenance payments from a spouse or former spouse as a basis for
repayment of the credit requested.56
Additionally, creditors can ask about marital status if the applicant resides
in a community property state;57 creditors can also ask about the number
and ages of the applicant’s dependents that a borrower has to support.58
To meet the goals of the ECOA, the FRB tasked member banks59 to
comply with the ECOA.60 Additionally, the FRB tasked many federal
agencies, including the Department of Justice, with the administrative
enforcement of the ECOA and Regulation B.61
56. 12 C.F.R. § 202.5(c)(2) (2009).
57. See id. § 202.5(d)(1) (“Marital status. If an applicant applies for individual unsecured
credit, a creditor shall not inquire about the applicant’s marital status unless the applicant resides
in a community property state or is relying on property located in such a state as a basis for
repayment of the credit requested. If an application is for other than individual unsecured credit, a
creditor may inquire about the applicant’s marital status, but shall use only the terms married,
unmarried, and separated. A creditor may explain that the category unmarried includes single,
divorced, and widowed persons.”).
58. See id. § 202.5(d)(3) (“A creditor shall not inquire about birth control practices, intentions
concerning the bearing or rearing of children, or capability to bear children. A creditor may
inquire about the number and ages of an applicant’s dependents or about dependent-related
financial obligations or expenditures, provided such information is requested without regard to
sex, marital status, or any other prohibited basis.”).
59. The Structure and Functions of the Federal Reserve System, FED. RES. EDUC.,
https://www.federalreserveeducation.org/about-the-fed/structure-and-functions (last visited Mar.
10, 2016). (“The member banks are stockholders of the Reserve Bank in their District and as such,
are required to hold 3 percent of their capital as stock in their Reserve Banks.”).
60. 15 U.S.C. § 1691c(a)(1)(b) (2012) (“Enforcing agencies. Compliance with the
requirements imposed under this title [15 USCS §§ 1691 et seq.], shall be enforced under: . . .
member banks of the Federal Reserve System (other than national banks) . . . .”).
61. Equal Credit Opportunity Act, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/hc
e/housing_ecoa.php (last visited Oct. 2, 2014) (The following agencies provide oversight under
the ECOA: Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Comptroller of Currency, Federal Reserve
Board, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, National Credit Union Association, Federal Trade
Commission.).
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C. CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU
In 2010, Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank)62 which created the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB).63 Among its vast array of
powers, the CFPB now oversees Regulation B and thereby the enforcement
and implementation of the ECOA.64 In December 2011, the CFPB updated
Regulation B to bring the regulation into compliance with Dodd-Frank. The
updates included requirements for creditors to provide applicants with free
copies of all appraisals and other written valuations.65 The CFPB also
adopted the FRB’s definition of “applicant”, which currently includes
guarantors.66 By adopting the FRB’s definition of “applicant,” the CFPB is
ensuring that the ECOA protects spousal guarantors.
II. THE IMPACT AND NECESSITY OF THE ECOA
It is difficult to measure the economic impact of the ECOA alone.
However, when taken together with other acts working in conjunction with
each other, the ECOA’s impact has been positive. In 2014 alone, the Justice
Department has settled over $1 billion in monetary relief for all types of
credit discrimination.67 This includes recovery under the various acts
working in conjunction with the ECOA, including the Fair Housing Act68
and the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act.69 In a recent article by Dubravka
Ritter, a Senior Industry Specialist at the FRB of Philadelphia, Ms. Ritter
wrote, “[d]isparate treatment of protected classes in credit markets is
certainly less common than it was 40 years ago. Disparate impact, however,
may persist so long as credit qualifications that lenders consider are affected
by markets where discrimination continues to occur.”70 Thus, “[i]t is for this
reason that the ECOA continues to be relevant today.”71
62. See generally Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank
Act), Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 2, 124 Stat. 1376, 1386 (2010) (codified in 12 U.S.C. § 5301
(2012)).
63. Dodd-Frank Act § 1021, 12 U.S.C. § 5511.
64. See CFPB Consumer Laws and Regulations: Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA),
CONSUMER FIN. 1 (June 2013), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201306_cfpb_laws-and-
regulations_ecoa-combined-june-2013.pdf.
65. Id.; see also 12 C.F.R. § 1002 (2011).
66. 12 C.F.R. § 1002.2.
67. Protecting Borrowers From Credit Discrimination in All Forms, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE
(Aug. 1, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/opa/blog/protecting-borrowers-credit-discrimination-all-
forms [hereinafter Protecting Borrowers] (“These cases include the record $335 million
settlement of a 2011 lawsuit against Bank of America for the activities of Countrywide Financial
and the $234 million settlement of a 2012 lawsuit against Wells Fargo Bank.”).
68. See Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619 (2012).
69. Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 3901–4043 (2012); see also Protecting
Borrowers, supra note 67.
70. Ritter, supra note 24, at 1.
71. Id. at 38.
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Ms. Ritter also noted that evidence of discrimination in consumer credit
is difficult to measure because there is relatively little to no data on such
discrimination.72 This is due in part to the fact that there is no reporting
requirement similar to the one found in the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act
(HDMA).73 “Nevertheless, statistically significant differences between
[protected classes and base groups] remain even after accounting for a
variety of factors and using a range of econometric techniques.”74 From
this, it is evident that discrimination still exists in lending practices;
therefore, the protections offered by the ECOA and Regulation B should
not be scaled back, but rather expanded to protect those most at risk of
credit discrimination.
III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT CASES
A. THE SIXTHCIRCUIT’SDECISION
In RL BB Acquisition, LLC v. Bridgemill Commons Dev. Grp., LLC, the
Sixth Circuit expanded the scope of the ECOA’s definition of “applicant”
by reading in Regulation B’s definition of “applicant,” to include
guarantors.75 The case arose from an appeal by defendant Starr Stone
Dixon.76 The Sixth Circuit overruled the decision of the district court,
which held that the defendant could not “assert a violation of [the ECOA]
and its implementing regulation, Regulation B, as an affirmative defense.”77
Around 2005, Starr’s husband, Bernard Dixon, invested millions of
dollars into two residential developments—one named Bridgemill
Commons and the other named Mabry Farms.78 By 2008, during the Great
Recession, the investments were nearly $10 million in debt.79 Mabry Farms
owed approximately $3.2 million to United Community Bank and
Bridgemill Commons owed $6.4 million to Regions Bank.80 The listed
borrower on the Regions Bank loan for the Bridgemill Commons
development was Bridgemill Commons Development Group, LLC
(BCDG), a company owned by Bernard specifically for the development of
the two properties. Bernard sought to refinance the investments and
approached a loan officer at BB&T Bank (BB&T).81
72. See id. at 29.
73. Id.; see also 12 U.S.C. § 2803 (2012).
74. Ritter, supra note 24, at 29.
75. RL BB Acquisition, LLC v. Bridgemill Commons Dev. Grp., LLC, 754 F.3d 380 (6th Cir.
2014).
76. Id. at 381.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 381–82.
80. Id. at 382.
81. Id.
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After reviewing the loan application, BB&T concluded that Bernard
and his company were not independently creditworthy for a loan and
needed additional collateral.82 As additional collateral, Bernard pledged
approximately 40,000 shares of BB&T stock and a corporate debenture and
Starr pledged approximately 40,000 shares of BB&T shares, which she
owned individually.83 To insure the loan further, both Bernard and Starr
individually executed a personal guaranty.84 The parties disputed whether
the loan officer had required Starr to execute a guaranty.85 Bernard insists
that Bryan demanded that Starr provide a guaranty.86 The court explained
documentary evidence showed that Starr was “required to co-sign the notes
with her future release subject to negotiation.”87 When the loan became due,
BCDG paid less than $2 million of the principal, and thus defaulted on the
loan.88 As such, Starr, as a guarantor, became liable for the loan. Starr
claimed that the actions of the lender, by requiring Starr to sign as a
guarantor so that her husband’s company could obtain a loan, was a clear
violation of the ECOA and Regulation B.
The court raised two issues: First, “whether Regulation B’s definition
of ‘applicant,’ which differs from the definition in [the] ECOA, is entitled
to deference such that guarantors may raise [the] ECOA claims. Second . . .
if a spouse-guarantor can assert a violation of Regulation B – and therefore
of [the] ECOA – as an affirmative defense.”89
The court acknowledged that the ECOA’s definition of “applicant” does
not explicitly include guarantors. However, because Regulation B’s
definition of “applicant” does include “guarantor,” the court utilized the
two-step inquiry from Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. (also known as Chevron deference) to determine if the court
should defer to the FRB’s interpretation of the ECOA and thereby its
definition of “applicant” in Regulation B.90 At step one of the inquiry “[the
court] must ask whether ECOA’s definition of ‘applicant’ unambiguously
excludes guarantors, or whether the statute is ambiguous in the issue.”91 The
Sixth Circuit held that the term “applicant” is ambiguous as defined in the
ECOA, “because it could be read to include third parties who do not initiate
an application for credit, and who do not seek credit for themselves – a
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 383.
89. Id. at 384.
90. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984).
91. RL BB Acquisition, 754 F.3d at 384; see also Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43 (“First, always,
is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent
of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give
effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”).
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category that includes guarantors.”92 The court reached this conclusion by
first looking at the dictionary definitions of “applies” and “credit.”
“Applies,” as defined in the Oxford English Dictionary means “to make
an appeal or a request esp. formally and often in writing and usually for
something of benefit to oneself,” or “to make an approach to (a person) for
information or aid; to have recourse or make application to, to appeal to, to
make a (formal) request for.”93 Therefore, the court concluded that although
a guarantor does not approach a creditor to seek credit, a guarantor is a third
party to a larger application process.94 The court delved into the technicality
of how a guarantor approaches a creditor and concluded that technically a
guarantor approaches a creditor in order to offer up his or her own personal
liability if a borrower defaults.95 The court also acknowledged that although
one permissible reading of this definition would indicate that only the
applicant can apply for credit, the “test could just as easily encompass all
those who offer promises in support of an application – including
guarantors, who make formal requests for aid in the form of credit for a
third party.”96
Next, the court found ambiguity in the statutory definition of the word
“credit.” The ECOA defines “credit” as “the right granted by a creditor to a
debtor to defer payment of debt or to incur debts and defer its payment or to
purchase property or services and defer payment therefor.”97 The court
interpreted this definition to mean that in the ECOA, “an ‘applicant’
requests credit, but a ‘debtor’ reaps the benefit. The use of these two
different terms suggests that the applicant and the debtor are not always the
same person.”98 The court thus concluded, “[if] an applicant is not
necessarily the debtor, it would be reasonable to conclude that the applicant
could be a third party, such as a guarantor.”99
At step two of the Chevron deference analysis, the court had to
determine whether the regulation stemmed from a permissible construction
of the statute.100 The court gave deference to the FRB’s definition of
“applicant.” The court looked at the history of Regulation B and found that
the FRB originally proposed that guarantors be deemed applicants
throughout the regulation; however, it was limited to the Spousal-Guarantor
92. RL BB Acquisition, 754 F.3d at 384–85.
93. Id. at 385.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.; 15 U.S.C. § 1691a(d) (2012).
98. RL BB Acquisition, 754 F.3d at 385.
99. Id.
100. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) (“The
court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute . . . . Rather, if the statute is silent
or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”).
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Rule.101 The court finally concluded that including guarantors within the
meaning of applicant was not arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to
the statute.102 Furthermore, the court reasoned that Congress amended the
statute multiple times since the FRB adopted Regulation B, but Congress
never attempted to remove “guarantor” from the FRB’s definition of
“applicant.” Therefore, the Sixth Circuit court did not feel compelled to
remove guarantors from the definition.103 The court held that the ECOA
protections apply to guarantors, and as such, a spousal guarantor can bring
an independent lawsuit for ECOA violations.104
B. THE EIGHTHCIRCUIT’SDECISION
In Hawkins v. Community Bank of Raymore, the Eighth Circuit came to
the opposite decision of the Sixth Circuit, holding that the ECOA clearly
defined “applicant” and thus, the definition should not include the
Regulation B’s definition of “applicant.” In Hawkins, Gary Hawkins and
Chris Patterson were the only members of a residential development
company named PHC Development, LLC (PHC).105 Between 2005 through
2008, Community Bank of Raymore (Community) loaned PHC more than
$2,000,000 to finance the development of a residential subdivision.106 To
secure the loan, Gary Hawkins’ wife, Valerie, and Chris Patterson’s wife,
Janice, executed personal guaranties.107 In April 2012, PHC defaulted on
the loan; thus, Valerie and Janice became personally liable for the loan
payment.108
Valerie and Janice filed an action against Community, alleging that
Community had required them to execute the guaranties securing PHC’s
loans because they were married to their husbands.109 They argued that the
guaranties were unenforceable because the lender obtained the guaranties in
violation of the ECOA, and that the court should not void the FRB’s
definition of “applicant” and thereby impede the efforts of the ECOA to
eradicate discriminatory lending practices.110 Valerie and Janice also argued
101. RL BB Acquisition, 754 F.3d at 386.
102. Id.; see also Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.
103. RL BB Acquisition, 754 F.3d at 386.
104. Id. at 387.
105. Hawkins v. Cmty. Bank of Raymore, 761 F.3d 937, 939 (8th Cir. 2014); Brief of
Appellants at 6, Hawkins v. Cmty. Bank of Raymore, 761 F.3d 937 (8th Cir. 2014) (No. 13-3065),
2013 WL 6069373, at *6 (“Whereas the Spouses’ respective husbands, Gary Hawkins and Chris
Patterson, were members and officers of PHC either in their individual capacity or as a trustee, the
Spouses were no members, officers, or otherwise interested in PHC.”).
106. Hawkins, 761 F.3d at 939.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.; Brief of Appellants at 13, Hawkins v. Cmty. Bank of Raymore, 761 F.3d 937 (8th Cir.
2014) (No. 13-3065), 2013 WL 6069373, at *8 (“Defining guarantors as ‘applicants’ with regards
to signature requirements best forwards the ECOA’s purpose of eradicating gender and marital
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that if the FRB’s definition of “applicant” was not read into the ECOA, it
would require spousal guarantors to wait until the commencement of legal
action against them to assert an affirmative defense as to the illegality of the
guaranty.111 By requiring the guarantor to wait, the guarantor might
“experience financial difficulty, struggle to obtain individual credit because
of these large contingent liabilities, and suffer mental and emotional distress
resulting from the inability to obtain credit.”112
Similar to the Sixth Circuit, the issue before the court was whether the
court should apply the Regulation B or the ECOA definition of “applicant.”
To answer this administrative question, the court turned to the Chevron
two-step analysis.113 Applying the first step, the court concluded that the
“text of the ECOA clearly provides that a person does not qualify as an
applicant under the statute solely by virtue of executing a guaranty to secure
the debt of another.”114 Under the ECOA, an applicant must apply to a
creditor for credit. Since the court found that Congress provided a clear
definition of “applicant” in the ECOA, the FRB lacked the discretion to
take an expansive interpretation of “applicant,” by including, among others,
guarantors. Therefore, the FRB was bound by the ECOA’s definition as
determined by the Eighth Circuit.115
Specifically, the court looked to the dictionary definition of “apply.”
“Apply means to make an appeal or request especially formally and often in
writing and usually for something of benefit to oneself.”116 From this
definition, the court concluded that, “the plain language of the ECOA
unmistakably provides that a person is an applicant only if she requests
credit.”117 Subsequently, the court considered the definition of guaranty: “A
‘guaranty’ . . . is a promise to answer for another person’s debt, default, or
failure to perform. More specifically, a guaranty is an undertaking by a
guarantor to answer for payment of some debt, or performance of some
contract, of another person in the event of a default.”118 From this, the court
concluded that a guarantor does not request credit and thus, does not qualify
as an applicant under the ECOA. Therefore, the protections of the ECOA
are not available to a spousal guarantor.
The court went on to refute the holding and rationale of the Sixth
Circuit’s decision.119 The Eighth Circuit did not find that an individual’s
status based credit discrimination. The Court should avoid eliminating entire aspects of the
Federal Reserve Board’s ECOA implementation scheme upon which consumers and lenders have
relied for decades without Congressional interference or amendment.”).
111. Brief of Appellants, 2013 WL 6069373, at *28.
112. Id.
113. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
114. Hawkins, 761 F.3d at 941.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.; see also 38 AM. JUR. 2D Guaranty § 1 (2014).
119. Hawkins, 761 F.3d at 941–42.
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assumption of a secondary, contingent liability amounted to a request for
credit.120 “A guarantor engages in different conduct, receives different
benefits, and exposes herself to different legal consequences than does a
credit applicant.”121 The court pointed to a Seventh Circuit decision, in
which Judge Posner stated, “there is nothing ambiguous about ‘applicant’
and no way to confuse an applicant with a guarantor.”122 Therefore, because
Congress’s definition of “applicant,” according to the Eighth Circuit was
unambiguous in the ECOA, and that definition did not include “guarantor,”
guarantors are not offered the same protections as applicants under the
ECOA.123
IV. THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT’S RULING IS JUDICIALLY
CORRECT
Judicially, the Eighth Circuit was correct to deny Regulation B’s
expansion of the word “applicant.” First, Regulation B’s definition of
“applicant” fails the Chevron deference test. At step one of the inquiry, the
court must ask “[i]f the intent of Congress is clear.”124 Because Congress
clearly and explicitly defined “applicant” in the ECOA, the court should
end its Chevron analysis altogether.125 If there is no ambiguity in
Congress’s definition, the court does not need to entertain the second step
of the inquiry. Therefore, the FRB is required to follow Congress’s
unambiguously expressed intent and cannot implement their own definition.
Second, by looking at the dictionary definitions of “apply”126 and
“guaranty,”127 the court correctly concluded that the applicant is the person
who applies for the benefit. The guarantor does not request credit and as
such, the guarantor is not an applicant. Typically, a guarantor does not
expect any personal benefit; rather they know that the applicant will be the
one who receives the benefit. Since the ECOA’s definition of “applicant”
120. Id. at 942.
121. Id. at 941–42.
122. Id. at 942 (citing Moran Foods, Inc. v. Mid-Atl. Mkt. Dev. Co., 476 F.3d 436, 441 (7th Cir.
2007)).
123. Id.
124. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
125. 15 U.S.C. § 1691a(b) (2012); Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43 (“First, always, is the question
whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is
clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”). When Congress grants an agency this authority,
the courts give controlling weight to the agency’s definition “unless they are arbitrary, capricious,
or manifestly contrary to the statute.” Id. at 844.
126. Hawkins, 761 F.3d at 941 (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
105 (1971) (“To ‘apply’ means ‘to make an appeal or request esp[ecially] formally and often in
writing and usually for something of benefit to oneself.’”).
127. Id. at 941 (“A ‘guaranty’ . . . is a promise to answer for another person’s debt, default, or
failure to perform. More specifically, a guaranty is an undertaking by a guarantor to answer for
payment of some debt, or performance of some contract, of another person in the event of a
default.”).
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does state “any person who applies to a creditor,”128 by reading in the
definition of “apply,” the Eighth Circuit correctly held that “applicant” does
not include “guarantor,” because the guarantor does not apply for credit as
the applicant does. In the ECOA, the term “applicant” applied to any person
who sought credit.129 The logical conclusion from this would be that an
applicant is the person who applies for credit and thereby the person who
approaches the lender. A guarantor does not approach the lender to inquire
about credit for oneself, but instead personally guarantees payment to the
lender on behalf of the applicant, so that the applicant can receive a loan.
Third, although the FRB sought to include “guarantor” in the definition
of “applicant” in 1976,130 after receiving comments on the proposed change,
the FRB provided that “a guarantor, surety, endorser or similar party is not
an applicant.”131 The FRB concluded that the scope of the ECOA was broad
enough to prevent credit discrimination on its own.132 Only in 1985 did the
FRB change the definition of “applicant” in Regulation B, thus coming into
direct conflict with Congress’s intent.133 The FRB redefined “applicant”
because they were dissatisfied with Congress’s decision to limit the cause
of action under the ECOA to an “aggrieved applicant.”134 The FRB believed
that allowing guarantors to sue under the ECOA would enhance the
protection of individuals susceptible to discrimination. However, the
ultimate decision to change (and thereby expand) the definition of
“applicant” rests solely with Congress.135
Fourth, in Community Bank of Raymore’s Brief (Appellee Brief), the
appellee looked at Congress’ intent in passing the ECOA. “[T]he essential
prohibition in [the] legislation is directed at discrimination against
applicants.”136 Congress did not intend to protect guarantors in this
legislation and clearly only intended to protect applicants. Further,
President Ford, in his signing statement of the ECOA, acknowledged that a
person “to whom credit is denied is entitled to know of the reason for that
denial.”137 The President’s statement indicates that he believed the ECOA’s
128. 15 U.S.C. § 1691a(b).
129. Id.
130. Hawkins, 761 F.3d at 944 (Colloton J., concurring); see also Equal Credit Opportunity, 41
Fed. Reg. 29,870, 29,871 (July 20, 1976).
131. Hawkins, 761 F.3d at 944 (Colloton J., concurring); see also Equal Credit Opportunity, 41
Fed. Reg. 49,123, 49,124, 49,132 (Nov. 8, 1977).
132. Hawkins, 761 F.3d at 944 (Colloton J., concurring).
133. Brief of Appellee, at 21, Hawkins v. Cmty. Bank of Raymore, 761 F.3d 937 (8th Cir.
2014) (No. 13-3065), 2013 WL 6979611, at *14.
134. Hawkins, 761 F.3d at 944; Brief of Respondent at 41, Hawkins v. Cmty. Bank of Raymore,
136 S.Ct. 19 (2015) (No. 14-520), 2015 WL 4550210.
135. Hawkins, 761 F.3d at 945.
136. Brief of Appellee at 20, Hawkins v. Cmty. Bank of Raymore, 761 F.3d 937 (8th Cir. 2014)
(No. 13-3065), 2013 WL 6979611, at *14 (emphasis in original).
137. Statement on Signing the Equal Credit Opportunity Act Amendments of 1976, 1 Pub.
Papers 250 (Mar. 23, 1976).
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purpose was to protect the person who was denied credit—the “applicant.”
Because a guarantor cannot be denied credit, it is not surprising that the
word guarantor does not appear in the ECOA’s definition of applicant.
Finally, in Hawkins’ brief (Appellant Brief), the appellants argue that
Congress has not taken any action to change the FRB’s expanded
interpretation of the term “applicant.”138 The basic premise of the
appellant’s argument is that because Congress did not affirmatively act to
change Regulation B’s amendment to the term “applicant” when the FRB
expanded its definition, Congress must believe that the FRB’s expanded
definition is not in conflict with its own definition under the ECOA.139 Just
because Congress did not act to override the decision of the agency does not
indicate that the FRB’s definition supersedes the clear intent of Congress.
Congress’ inaction or silence does not equate to approval of the FRB’s
actions.
The “fundamental principle of statutory construction . . . [is] that the
meaning of a word cannot be determined in isolation, but must be drawn
from the context in which it used.”140 Thus, when the ECOA is considered
as a whole, it is evident that Congress did not intend to include guarantors
within the definition of “applicant.”141 “The context here is that the word
‘applicant’ appears in the ECOA over 50 times.”142 Congress could have
applied the ECOA broadly by prohibiting discrimination against “persons”
instead of limiting it to “applicants.”143 Instead, Congress chose to limit the
reach of the ECOA specifically to “applicants.” Thus, when Congress
creates legislation, and an agency promulgates regulation that is contrary to
the clear and unambiguous intent of Congress, the agency is bound by
Congress’s intent.
V. CONGRESS SHOULD AMEND THE ECOA
Although the Eighth Circuit was correct in its ruling, the decision
unfortunately leaves spousal guarantors without proper recourse should
they fall victim to discriminatory lending practices. Credit discrimination
still occurs today, and as such, the ECOA remains relevant and necessary to
prevent credit discrimination. By mid-2014, the Department of Justice
attained over $1 billion in monetary relief for violations of the ECOA and
tangent acts.144 Specific to gender-based credit discrimination, in 2013, a
study found that women in Chicago were 24 percent less likely to receive a
138. Brief of Appellants at 31, Hawkins v. Cmty. Bank of Raymore, 761 F.3d 937 (8th Cir.
2014) (No. 13-3065), 2013 WL 6069373, at *14.
139. Id. at 30–31.
140. Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 132 (1993).
141. Brief of Respondent at 28–29, Hawkins v. Cmty. Bank of Raymore, 135 S.Ct. 1492 (2015)
(No. 14-520), 2015 WL 4550210.
142. Id. at 29.
143. Id.
144. See Protecting Borrowers, supra note 67.
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new home mortgage than men were.145 Additionally, lenders were thirty-
nine percent less likely to refinance a woman’s mortgage than a man’s
mortgage.146 Another study found that the Department of Housing and
Urban Development has been investigating numerous claims that lenders
were denying loans to women on maternity leave.147 There also has been
extensive coverage of the difference in pay between men and women.
Research has shown that “college-educated millennial men made $20,000
more per year than women with the same education level.”148 Although
there is no data that shows that women guarantors are the ones who solely
face credit discrimination, from these various examples of the hardships
that women face in their daily lives, it is not farfetched to imagine that
women are also more likely than not to be the ones directly impacted by
gender discrimination in lending practices.
While the ECOA clearly and explicitly defines “applicant,” Congress
should expand the definition to include guarantors. However, the expansion
should be limited to the Spousal Guarantor Rule originally implemented by
the FRB,149 thus expanding the ECOA’s protection only to the spousal
guarantors. By adding this provision, spousal guarantors who are the victim
of discriminatory lending practices due to their marital status or gender,
would now have sufficient legal standing to sue the lender before defaulting
on the loan. Additionally, by limiting the definition of “applicant” to
spousal guarantors as opposed to all “guarantors,” lenders will be better
protected from frivolous lawsuits, since not every guarantor would have
standing to sue for ECOA violations. Furthermore, this provision prevents
the circumvention of the ECOA. For example, husbands may be required to
guarantee their wives loans in order to ensure that a male is there to
“guarantee” a female’s loan. While the wife can sue the lender as an
applicant, the husband would not be able to. This specifically puts an undue
burden on the wife to obtain the permission of her husband to obtain a loan.
By granting a spousal guarantor standing to sue a lender, a lender would not
require a spouse to sign as a guarantor, where the spouse can sign as a co-
applicant or the spouse’s signature is unnecessary. Whether it is requiring
females to have their spouse sign as a guarantor or denying a spousal
145. Lisa Prevost, Investigating Sex Discrimination, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 12, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/24/realestate/investigating-sex-discrimination-by-lenders.html?
_r=1 [hereinafter Prevost, Investigating Sex Discrimination] (“A settlement announced this month
involves a Navy veteran who said a PNC Mortgage representative in Trumbull, Conn., told her
she had to be back at work from maternity leave to obtain a Veterans Affairs loan.”).
146. See Hallman, supra note 3.
147. See Prevost, Investigating Sex Discrimination, supra note 145.
148. Charlotte Alter, Millennial Women Are Still Getting Paid Less Than Men, TIME (June 13,
2014), http://time.com/2870940/millennial-women-are-still-getting-paid-less-than-men/.
149. 12 C.F.R. § 202.7(d)(1) (2009).
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guarantor the standing to sue a lender for ECOA violations, women are
unfairly disadvantaged.150
Failing to expand the definition of “applicant” to include a spousal
guarantor will create financial difficulty for the guarantor as they “struggle
to obtain individual credit because of [the] large contingent liabilities, and
suffer mental and emotional distress resulting from the inability to obtain
credit.”151 The guarantee would “appear on the spouse’s credit report and
impact her credit scores.”152 If the applicant defaults on the debt, “the
spouse’s credit reports will show the delinquencies, thereby tarnishing her
credit history and ability to secure credit – even if she pays the debt.”153
Additionally, this split ruling between the Sixth and Eighth Circuits creates
confusion in the lending industry, as there have been numerous conflicting
decisions on this matter.154 Therefore, it is in the best interest of all parties
involved that Congress amend the ECOA to alleviate judicial uncertainty.
An argument could be made that as credit decisions become more
automated with credit more commonly being determined by computer
algorithms, opportunities for discrimination have been reduced.155 While
gender-based credit discrimination has decreased since the passage of the
ECOA, it still exists today.156 Further, as seen in Hawkins and RL BB
Acquisition, LLC, the guarantors in both cases alleged credit discrimination
because they were married to their husbands. In Hawkins, because of the
liabilities Valerie faced as a guarantor in default, she suffered damage to her
credit and her ability to qualify for credit in the future.157 Thus, although the
credit process is automated, creditors still have a significant amount of
influence on each individual loan. This leaves open the possibility that a
creditor would require a spouse to sign as a guarantor to a loan, where the
applicant is otherwise creditworthy. Therefore, Congress should strengthen
the ECOA so that a spousal guarantor would have standing to sue a lender
when they are required to sign as a guarantor for their spouse’s loan where
it is otherwise unnecessary.
150. While male spousal guarantors face the same undue burden, based on the above-mentioned
examples of the hardships that women face, it is more likely than not that women are more likely
to face the consequences of this void in the law.
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Finally, as stated above, there is currently no law that requires reporting
and surveying of discrimination in consumer credit.158 While the topic of
this Note is about the circuit split and the need to amend the ECOA to
redefine “applicant,” it is important to advocate for a reporting requirement.
The absence of a reporting requirement creates difficulty in measuring the
impact of discrimination.159 As such, future legislatures cannot amend the
laws as needed to prevent discrimination. Therefore, the ECOA should
incorporate a reporting requirement, similar to that found in the HDMA to
improve the documentation of gender-based credit discrimination, which in
turn would provide invaluable information to draft future legislation.160
CONCLUSION
Women have faced and continue to face discrimination in many areas
of life, including in lending practices. While legislation such as the ECOA
has helped mitigate the impact of such discrimination and aided in the
advancements women contribute to society, it has not completely eradicated
the problem. Although there is no indication that lenders will have a woman
reapply for credit under her husband’s name once she is married,161 there
could still be other forms of gender discrimination. While the Eighth Circuit
was judicially correct in their ruling on Congress’s interpretation of the
term “applicant,” as a matter of policy, Congress should amend the ECOA’s
definition of “applicant” to include spousal guarantors as defined in
Regulation B by the FRB. 162 This amendment to the ECOA would not
negatively or drastically impact the lending industry, as almost all lenders
likely follow Regulation B as written.163 Instead, this amendment will
simply ensure that everyone has equal access to credit. The positive
contributions women make to societal advancement should not be hindered
simply because they are required to be a guarantor to their husband’s loans.
It is now on Congress to address this problem by adopting Regulation B’s
definition of “applicant.”
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